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In this essay I will use Roger Scruton’s analysis of how we hear
music to show that musical understanding can occur at two lev-
els. I will then argue for a specific standard of musical meaning
based on Scruton’s criterion for objectivity and Frege’s notions of
understanding and meaning as presented in Scruton’s work. On
the basis of this standard of meaning, I will conclude meaning is
legitimately found in music, but only at one of the possible levels
of understanding.
In his book Understanding Music, Roger Scruton anatomises the
process whereby humans hear music. He maintains that it is a
three-step process: ‘There is a vibration in the air; by virtue of
this vibration we hear a sound, which is a ‘secondary object’,
heard as a pure event; and in this sound we hear an organisation
that is not reducible to any properties of the sound, nor to any
properties of the vibration that caused it’ (2009: 47).
This description intentionally discounts the physical object whose
vibrations caused those in the air, and to which we typically at-
tribute noise, such as a musical instrument. That Scruton should
ignore the physical cause of sound is unsurprising, given that
his theory of meaning depends upon the ascription of a ‘virtual
1 Connor Haynes is an undergraduate student at Columbia University. He is cur-
rently reading for philosophy and economics.
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causality’ that he believes can only be imparted to pure events.2
A more inclusive and exhaustive description of the hearing pro-
cess than Scruton provides will be helpful here.
First, a physical object vibrates. The vibration sends waves
through the air. Our eardrums convert these vibrations into elec-
tronic signals in the brain. The brain interprets the electronic
signals and projects into the consciousness of the agent the sen-
sory experience of sound. It is at this point in the process that
the noise is either interpreted as ‘music’ or not. Scruton claims
that the quality of ‘music’ is something rational beings attribute
to the noise. He supports this belief by claiming that the prop-
erties of music are not reducible to either the basic qualities of
the noise or the airwaves that caused the noise. In other words,
music could never be described strictly in terms of the properties
of sound or airwaves.
A few points are valuable to note here. For Scruton, hearing
music in sound is an active process requiring cognitive abilities
that are only possessed by rational beings: ‘Only a rational being
[. . . ] can experience sound in this way; hence, although we can
hear music in the songs of birds [. . . ] they themselves are deaf
to it’ (2009: 5). To illustrate, consider a C.D. player playing in
the forest, where there is no one there to hear it. Does it make a
sound? No. It creates airwaves but they are not converted into
electronic impulses or psychological noise. Then, even less so
does it make music. According to Scruton, even if animals were
present to experience the noise, there would still be no music be-
cause they don’t have the sort of consciousness that can organise
sounds in the appropriate way.
The mental action of hearing music in sound occurs at an in-
stinctual level. Similarly to hearing speech, we don’t need to
conceptualise what we hear in order to understand it. It hap-
pens automatically. But, also like speech, a higher level of un-
derstanding also exists. A grammarian may study the structure
of a sentence, and a rhetorician may study the way language
effects humans emotionally. A higher-level understanding of mu-
sic, then, would include meta-knowledge of musical structures
such as tones, rhythms, melodies, etc. This may include the abil-
2 For example, this refers to events that are divorced from their causes and physical
space.
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ity to recognise these structures, as well as the way they combine
to affect a listener.
This begs the question: can we hear music without understand-
ing it? I would argue that we could not. In agreement with
Scruton, I hold that the very act of hearing music implies an in-
stinctual understanding. Without this instinctual understanding
a song would sound like mere noise to us, much the same way
completely foreign languages sound like noise. Please note that
in this paragraph I am using the term ‘understanding’ to refer to
the cognitive act that would correspond to objective understand-
ing. In other words, if what a listener thought they understood
was in fact correct. With this sense of understanding, someone
can ‘understand’ a work of music without that music having any
actual meaning.
There seem to be two separate levels of musical understanding.
The first one is instinctual like speech recognition, and occurs any
time something is recognised as music. The other is intellectual
and involves conceptual understanding of the music that is heard.
By analogy, someone may understand the brilliance of a rhetori-
cal speech because they understand the principles of rhetoric the
speaker used. Another man in the audience was simply carried
away by the speech. On the opposite side, a composition may in-
vert all the principles of music very deliberately, a demonstration
that shows a mastery and knowledge of all elements by their very
reversal. The connoisseurs may appreciate this move, though not
the lay audience. The serial music of Schoenberg may be an ex-
ample of this.
All this suggests that music can have meaning on at least two
basic levels. The second axis of musical meaning is the dichotomy
between musical and extra-musical meaning. I assert that on
a general level musical meaning can all be classified according
to the following pairs of categories: instinctual/intellectual and
musical/extra-musical.
A real world example from Berlioz’ Symphonie Fantastique can
help illustrate these four basic concepts and the way they are em-
ployed. In the closing section of this work a church hymn called
Dies Irae, a very popular and well-known work at the time of the
symphony’s release, is ‘burlesqued’. It is altered in a way to ex-
press sacrilege. This musical variation has extra-musical meaning
because it relies on the cultural reference in the mind of the lis-
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tener between the song and church services. This happens on an
intellectual level and requires the conceptual recognition of the
cultural meaning of the piece. What makes this example particu-
larly interesting is that it also operates as musical (as opposed to
non-musical) meaning on the instinctual level. A listener would
instinctively relate what they hear to the original and hear musi-
cal relations, not just in the piece itself, but also between the al-
tered piece and its original. It should be noted that extra-musical
meaning can also be paired with instinctual understanding, and
purely musical meaning can certainly be paired with intellectual
understanding.
Keeping these notions in mind about the ways music can ex-
press meaning, I will now return to Scruton’s theory of objectivity.
Then, I will examine the implications of his theory for the types
of musical meaning I introduced above.
Because Scruton’s theory that sounds are a ‘pure event’ opens
him up to objections about the objective nature of sound (also
referred to as audibilia), he presents an argument for the objective
nature of sound experience. The claim that sound has the poten-
tial to be objective is important for me in this paper, not because
it is crucial for the theory of ‘pure events’, but because it is essen-
tial in order for there to be meaning in music at all, or so I will
argue.
Scruton introduces the idea of objectivity by comparing sound
experience to rainbows, which he calls ‘real and objective’. He
claims that rainbows existed before there were people to see them
(implying that sound also existed before there were people to
hear it). Namely, because, ‘the truth about rainbows consists in
the truth of a counter-factual, concerning what normal observers
would see where their eyes turned in a certain direction’ (2009:
24).
The crux of his statement is the term ‘normal observer’. I can
only imagine this meaning simply by what most people would see.
In other words, the objective quality of an object of experience is
determined by, well, consensus. This may seem strange, but in
my opinion, using consensus as the criterion defining objective
reality is our only option, not just for audibilia or rainbows, but
also for any sense experience whatsoever. How could we ever
determine what we considered objective but by uniformity of ex-
perience? Even if I saw something with my own eyes, if everyone
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around me denied seeing it, I would start to question my vision,
not theirs.
Now, consider the fact that our senses don’t always agree. When
they don’t we have a hierarchy according to which we rank the
reliability of their respective impressions. Tactile is the current
popular objective standard; if we can see something but can’t feel
it we say it is not actually there. We say that we are hallucinating.
In contrast, if we feel something in front of us that we cannot
see, we do not say we are having tactile hallucinations. Instead
we would likely assume something was wrong with our vision.
We use tactile sense as the ‘objective’ standard because it has
shown to be the most reliable, i.e., uniform. In essence, since it is
a four-dimensionally framed sense, we take a four-dimensional
framework to be the ultimate basis of the physical world.
The point is that all of experience is ultimately subjective and
the word ‘objective’ is simply applied to the sense perceptions
that are the most uniform, or have the strongest consensus. Now,
the quality of ‘objective’ has fuzzy boundaries. There is no spe-
cific proportion of the population that would have to experience
something in the same way for it to be considered objective, or at
least Scruton doesn’t provide one.
As for audibilia, however, Scruton asserts objectivity. This is
an interesting claim for two reasons, and both are related to his
notion of ‘pure events’. Firstly, because he denies the centrality
of the one characteristic linking sound to the four-dimensional
physical space we find so secure: its locational aspect. Secondly,
because he denies the primacy of sound’s other link to four-
dimensional space: its cause.
Regardless of Scruton’s claims regarding the status of sounds
as pure events, I think he is right that we all tend to have pretty
uniform experiences as far as noise itself (audibilia). The music
we attribute to the noise, however, is subject to quite a bit of
disagreement.
I will now explore the implications of this disagreement for
meaning in music. In Wittgenstein On Music Scruton references
Frege’s revelation about the notion of meaning: ‘The meaning of
a sentence is what we understand when we understand it’ (2009:
34). Similarly, to other words like ‘purpose’ or ‘value’, ‘meaning’
is often employed as if it did not require an agent. The literal,
‘what is an objects purpose/value/meaning?’, logically requires
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the addition of: for whom? Music, therefore, can only be meaning-
ful in the mind of an agent capable of ascribing meaning. Over-
whelming agreement on a meaning judgment may lead a group
of people to speak as though meaning resided in the object itself.
Strictly speaking, however, this is false. Meaning, then, is distinct
from the object and resides in the mind.
But, in order to knowwhether someone accurately understands
the music we would first have to know what the music means.
Thus, we are left without a foundation for determining the ob-
jective meaning of any music. I assert that when no individual’s
understanding is objectively verifiable, the remaining criterion
for a standard of meaning, and thus, of correct understanding is
that of consensus. Scruton makes the crucial observation, ‘The
connection has to be made in the understanding, and this under-
standing is part of a complex social process’.
In other words, your interpretation is correct if it is shared
with the most people. When applied to musical meaning, an
acceptable reformation of Scruton’s counter-factual basis for the
objectivity of sound experience, would be: a musical piece means
what most people understand, when they think they understand
it.
Meaning absolutely does not exist in a piece of music. A piece
of music has the potential to have meaning for someone. I am argu-
ing that, though a piece might be found ‘meaningful’ by someone,
they cannot be said to understand the music unless the meaning
they understand is objective, i.e., shared by most other people.
Interestingly, this move parallels the way Scruton characterises
sound experience. He recognises that sound occurs in the indi-
vidual, but that we can attribute it to objective reality, at least,
to the degree in which there is a consensus of experience. I
am claiming that while Scruton’s argument for the objectivity of
sound experience (audibilia) is inevitable, his conception of ob-
jectivity, though imprecise, could be applied to musical meaning.
This, in order to show that as a result of the extreme variability
of responses and interpretations, in many cases, music simply
doesn’t have a meaning.
If I were to guess at the cause of the conflicting responses to
music, I might speculate that because very few consequences fol-
low disagreement or misunderstanding of meaning in music, it
has never been necessary to develop a precise vocabulary of mu-
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sical experience. This, in turn, would have augmented the like-
lihood of differing interpretations. As a language, the spoken
word is much more precise than music, given that we constantly
rely on it to make crucial decisions. If the lives of our family
members often depended on information held by a person who
could only communicate by the violin, a specific vocabulary of
tones would presumably rapidly develop.
Something means whatever we understand when we under-
stand it, and we only understand it when we interpret it in a way
conformable to a standard of interpretation, dictated by a major-
ity consensus. Thus, in many cases music cannot be said to have
an objective meaning. Please note that I am absolutely not deny-
ing that we all feel certain things in response to music. Rather,
what I am denying is that what any of us feels in the music is
necessarily what the music can legitimately be said to mean.
It might be objected that a musical meaning can be objectively
imbued in a work by the author. There are problems with this
view, however, which parallel that of the intentional fallacy in
literary analysis. Firstly, an incapable author may try with all
his might to imbue a work with a specific meaning and fail to
do so. Secondly, meaning may be taken as that which was in
no way intended by the author. This shows that authorial intent
is neither a necessary nor sufficient cause for the perception of
meaning in a musical work.
It is true that if an author were to outright tell you what he
intended a piece to mean, it may affect the way you interpret it.
For instance, Beethoven describing the first four notes of the Fifth
Symphony as, ‘Fate knocking at the door’, gives us an example.
But, this would affect us in a similar way whether or not it was
the author telling us this, or whether or not it was actually the
author’s intent to express it in the piece. The fact is, the con-
sideration of authorial intent in the interpretation of a musical
piece neither commonly occurs in popular practice nor is often a
practicable option, particularly with many composers that are no
longer present.
Another alternative for a standard of meaning would be con-
sensus among experts. On a technical level there seems to be
more agreement among experts about the meaning of certain
works then in the public at large. Restricting to experts the popu-
lation from which consensus can be drawn is an interesting move.
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But, even among experts there is far too much disagreement for
any particular understanding to qualify as objective, though at
times certain interpretations do approach it. For instance, many
people claim Beethoven’s Fourth Movement in the Fifth Sym-
phony is ‘heroic’.
What then do the authors create and how do they attempt to
communicate meaning? It would stand to reason that they rely
on their own musical understanding (intellectual and instinctual).
They attempt to communicate what they hear when they listen to
a musical phrase, and assume it is applicable to their audience.
When a composer creates, her work is informed either by the
way these processes of instinctual and intellectual application to
noise of music and meaning occur within herself, how she ex-
pects these processes to operate in others, or a combination of
the two.
The composer recognises the principles whereby listeners ap-
ply music to sound and manipulates it for her own purposes.
While in theory any air vibrations whatsoever could be inter-
preted to have the greatest musical profundity this is generally
not the case, and as I will show later there is found to be much
agreement in instinctual musical understanding. A composer,
then, creates sound forms that she believes are likely to be clothed
by a listener as music either in the same way she does, or at least
in some generally similar way.
Unsurprisingly, the responses to various pieces change over
time. Pieces have undoubtedly meant different things at differ-
ent times. It is a legitimate question whether anyone today expe-
riences classical pieces from the past the same way as when they
were first produced, even though the noise dictated by the pieces
has not changed. Their meaning changes, or more accurately, the
meaning we place onto them changes. And, since this meaning is
much of the import of a musical piece in the first place, pieces are
surprisingly unstable entities. It is a hallmark of a lasting work
that it talks to the less fleeting parts of the human spirit.
Given the high instability of interpretive responses to music I
think Scruton’s criterion for objectivity applied to meaning im-
plies that a fair amount of music simply has no meaning. That is
not to say that we don’t all have experiences when we listen to it.
It is just saying that we cannot properly be said to ‘understand’ it,
or that it has meaning. Our listening experiences, instead, more
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closely resemble a populace on LSD; each person having their
own unique experience of music with no major consensus occur-
ring, or necessary. This is not necessarily a bad thing.
The diversity of meaning results in no universally, and in many
cases even generally, accepted standard of understanding for a
given phrase, work, movement, or idea. Only in the disciplines
of musicians themselves, does meaning become more generally
agreed upon, as it is used more often and with more conse-
quences than for the average listener. But, as Scruton notes,
even basic terms like ‘high’ and ‘low’ are spatial metaphors and
non-essential as far as possible ways of interpreting and thinking
about music.
There is, however, a persuasive counter-example. Scruton dis-
cusses an analogy made by Wittgenstein between instinctual mu-
sical understanding and the recognition of meaning in facial ex-
pressions. People often see the same thing in a face even if they
describe it in different terms or respond differently to it. So,
though descriptions of music may differ, they may simply be
descriptions of their different responses to the same type of in-
stinctual, recognitional type of understanding. This shows how
objective meaning can exist even when descriptions differ. As
Wittgenstein and Scruton note, however, we would have to look
elsewhere than verbal description for evidence of understanding.
Wittgenstein presents us with just such an option: their behavior.
Behavioral responses can be considered an acceptable way of
demonstrating understanding. If a person responds to an angry
face by becoming defensive it is a strong case for them having
recognised its meaning. If this were so with music, then, it would
still have to be discovered in some observable way that the music
was understood. This does in fact occur. There is often consen-
sus in the physical ways people respond to music. They may all
dance, grow solemn, sing along, etc., which all testifies to a uni-
formity of instinctual musical understanding. It is reasonable to
assume there is meaning in music, if only at the instinctual level,
because of the similarity of behavioral responses we observe. If
this is so, then, an objective has been found and people can legit-
imately be said to correctly or incorrectly understand any given
piece in at least one respect.
Scruton proposes a standard of objectivity for audibilia depen-
dent upon consensus of experience. This implies that they are
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all ultimately subjective but we can and should refer to them as
objective to the degree with which they are uniform. I agree with
this standard and even consider it applicable all the way down to
our most reliable tactile sense perceptions.
I feel, however, that Scruton underestimates the implications of
this view for musical meaning. It is true for the objective world;
it is certainly true for meaning and language. I conclude that
objective musical meaning does exist at the instinctual level be-
cause there is consensus of understanding that can be inferred
from the similar responses people have; observable other than by
verbal description, as per Wittgenstein, and behavior. In other
words, meaning in music happens when we all feel the desire to
dance to the beat.
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